With the internet having become an integral part of our Americans lives, it is necessary to protect and preserve free, open and nondiscriminatory internet access for all of us. Internet Service Providers are tasked with connecting users with the content and services available on the internet, not with regulating and managing what content users are able to connect to and how they connect.
It would be unacceptable for a phone company to redirect phone calls from one business to another and would be unfair for a phone company to charge different rates for equal service to two equal businesses. It would also be scandalous for a phone company to record customers phone conversations and then sell that data in order to inject advertisements into a customers telephone conversation.
In the same manner, it is and should be unacceptable for an Internet Service Provider to redirect requests from one website to another, and for an ISP to provide more bandwidth when requesting one site over another. It should be illegal for an ISP to record a customer’s web history and later sell that history to advertisers in order to inject targeted ads into the pages a customer has requested.
Title II places restrictions on phone companies that both protect consumers and create fertile ground for a healthy and robust communication infrastructure. In the same manner the public needs restrictions on ISP to both protect consumers from ISP overreach and create a healthy and fertile internet communication infrastructure that benefits all.
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.
There has been a recent push by governments and government agencies to ban End-to-End Strong Encryption, all under the guise of stopping terrorists and pedophiles. My hope here is to provide simple arguments in layman’s terms as to why banning strong end-to-end encryption will not improve the government’s, nor it’s agencies’, ability to catch the “Bad Guys”. In fact banning strong encryption will only daemonize legitimate users of strong encryption and undermine the rest of the population’s security, while having almost no effect on those who wish to use it for nefarious means.
A Markov Chain is a set of transitions from one state to the next; Such that the transition from the current state to the next depends only on the current state, the previous and future states do not effect the probability of the transition. A transitions independence from future and past sates is called the Markov Property. What we are going to do is explore Markov Chains through a little story and some code.
What it is
Lets start this post of with some techno-babble. Minimax is a depth-first search algorithm to find the least-lost strategy for zero-sum two person turn based games.
A zero-sum game is a game where, if one player loses, than another player must win the same number of points and vice-versa. For example chess is a zero-sum game because if one player wins (Lets say winning a score of +1) than the other player must lose (getting a score of -1), or the game is a draw and both players get a score of 0. We don’t give players that lose a score of 0 and the winner +1 because that would mean than one player won the game and the other player is at a draw, which is impossible in chess. The same goes for other games such as tic-tac-toe, Go, and four in a row. Another set of zero sum games are games where the total number of points is constant (think poker where players can’t buy chips) and if someone wins (a bet) than the rest of the players must lose points (money) equal to the number of points won.
Depth-first search means that we follow the algorithm all the way down until the end, and then start moving backwards, looking for the best move as we go. The reason why we have to follow the algorithm all the way to the end will become clear soon.
The other day I was playing with my Tor node’s configuration when I found out that with absolutely no trickery you can get Tor to log some interesting addresses. One of the things Tor logs is the address of edge (aka. exit) connections, which tells you what the node is connecting to but not who the connection is for.
Naturally it would be interesting to know what other people are using Tor for, so I kept a couple of days worth of logs and wrote this little perl script to parse them out for me.